D4QJMCMC Conference 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 L. LONDELL McMILLAN, 4 Plaintiff, 13 Civ. 1095 ALC DF 5 V. 6 BARCLAYS BANK LLC, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 10 11 April 26, 2013 2:40 p.m. 12 13 14 15 Before: 16 HON. ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., 17 District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

D4QJMCMC Conference 1 2 **APPEARANCES** 3 MEISTER SEELIG & FEIN, LLP 4 Attorneys for plaintiff BY: KEVIN A. FRITZ, Esq. Of counsel 5 6 7 BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP (DC) Attorneys for defendant Barclays Bank 8 BY: ANDREW MICHAELSON, Esq. GARY R. STUDEN, Esq. 9 Of counsel 10 11 KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP (NYC) 12 Attorneys for defendant Davis BY: JOEL ALAN BLANCHETT, Esq. 13 Of counsel 14 15 HUGHES HUBBARD & REED, LLP (NY) Attorneys for defendants Dicarmine & Sanders 16 BY: CHRISTINE MARIE FITZGERALD, Esq. NED BASSEN, Esq. 17 Of counsel 18 FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ, PC 19 Attorneys for defendant Canellas 20 BY: CAREN LERNER, Esq. Of counsel 21

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(In open court)

(Case called)

THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon.

I've read the parties' submissions. We're here for a premotion conference. I know the defendants wish to file a motion -- well, the individual defendants want to file a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and counsel for Barclays wants to file either a motion to stay the proceeding pending determination by the court in England or, in the alternative, a motion to dismiss in one of the earlier submissions by plaintiff's counsel indicated a desire to ask the court to refer the case to the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York.

Let me just hear very briefly from plaintiff's counsel as to why. Again I am not going to make an ultimate determination on any of these proposed motions that haven't been filed yet. Still your position, if you wish me to refer this to the bankruptcy court, why that would be appropriate?

MR. FRITZ: Your Honor, this action is obviously related to the bankruptcy. The standard is if it --

THE COURT: You can remain seated.

MR. FRITZ: -- concededly has any effect on the administration of the estate that is the subject of the bankruptcy, the matter should be referred.

Here the matter is certainly related to the bankruptcy

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because the individual defendants have asserted claims in the bankruptcy that they're entitled to indemnification, and the insurer has accepted coverage. There is also directors and officers insurance.

I should also note, your Honor, that in another lawsuit filed against three of the same individual defendants in California, they first removed the state court action in California to a bankruptcy court in California, and then they asked for it to be transferred to the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court, alleging that it was related to, alleging they had rights to indemnification, alleging they had directors and officers liability insurance. Based on their request, the court transferred the case to the bankruptcy court.

They are, in my opinion, estopped from now coming to you and taking a contrary position. What is obviously going on here, your Honor, is that they are, because Barclays filed first in London, and they know that that court does not have jurisdiction over individual defendants, they know we could not compel certain witnesses to produce documents or testify, they're trying to significantly prejudice my client's case by having it heard in London when the individual defendants can't be brought into that proceeding.

There is absolutely no reason, putting aside the bankruptcy court issue, why this matter shouldn't be heard here

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in New York. The plaintiff lives here. Barclays has an office in Times Square. Three of the four individual defendants live in New York and the witnesses are here in New York.

THE COURT: Thank you. Again, I have looked at the submissions, and you have attached a copy of that decision in the California case. That wasn't a situation in which the district court in the Northern District of California removed the case to the bankruptcy court or referred it to the bankruptcy court. The case that you attach was a decision from the bankruptcy court in the Northern District of California, simply transferring venue from the Northern District of California to the Southern District of New York, and that court specifically did not deal with the issues that I quess are troubling me right now.

Before I make any decision about referring the matter to the bankruptcy court or staying an action or possibly dismissing an action, obviously I'm told that I have to first deal with the matter of jurisdiction, whether I have jurisdiction over this matter.

You have alleged that the court has jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1334 because it is related to a bankruptcy proceeding. Then also in that chapter there are certain provisions for discretionary abstention by the court and there are also provisions for mandatory abstention by the court.

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I need to first deal with whether or not in the first instance I have jurisdiction, and if I do have jurisdiction, whether or not I am required to abstain or permitted to If I am required to abstain, obviously I must If I am permitted to abstain, I have to figure out whether or not it makes sense to abstain.

If your goal is automatically to have me refer this to the bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York, obviously I must first have jurisdiction and be able to retain jurisdiction. The other thing that I guess troubles me is after the Supreme Court's decision in Stern v. Marshal, since this is not something arising in a bankruptcy proceeding, but related to a bankruptcy proceeding, if I have jurisdiction and if I am not required to abstain from hearing this matter or permitted to abstain from hearing this matter, if it is referred to the bankruptcy court, would the bankruptcy court have the power to ultimately render a final decision on this because it does not arise in bankruptcy?

And those are the matters that the Northern District of California bankruptcy judge specifically did not deal with, basically punted to the bankruptcy court of the Southern District of New York. What is your position on those matters?

MR. FRITZ: I would note you're obviously correct, the state court action was removed to the bankruptcy court in California and then transferred to the Southern District

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Bankruptcy Court, but what you should note is that the reason why it was moved from the state court action to the bankruptcy in California is because the individual defendants did that. So they obviously didn't move it from the state court action to the bankruptcy action, to the bankruptcy court in California to have it sit there. They did it because that step was necessary to then transfer it to the bankruptcy court.

I am a little confused why they are disputing that the bankruptcy court is the proper venue, and I should note that in that proceeding that was transferred to the Southern District Bankruptcy Court, they haven't asked for it to be removed or remanded to this Court.

THE COURT: That is fine. They can ask for whatever they want to ask for. You can ask for whatever you want to ask for. The parties cannot give me subject matter jurisdiction over a matter over which I don't have jurisdiction by consent.

The parties can consent to personal jurisdiction, but they can't by their consent bestow upon the court subject matter jurisdiction if the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, nor can the parties by their consent prevent the court from abstaining if the court is required to abstain from exercising that jurisdiction, but thank you.

Let me hear from the defendants on this because it seems to me again there are several motions being bandied about, or it seems as a preliminary matter I need to first deal

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with the issue whether or not I have jurisdiction, whether or not I am required to abstain or are permitted to abstain. may make sense to deal with those issues first. Let me hear from the defendants on any of this.

MR. BASSEN: Ned Bessen from Hughes Hubbard & Reed.

We represented the defendants in the Bunso case you are talking about in California, so I am quite familiar with That is very different from the case here. The case there was by a former partner of the law firm who was suing with respect to his joining the law firm as a partner.

The law firm is in bankruptcy, so it was all tied up, was really a derivative claim against the law firm. Here in terms of subject matter jurisdiction, what we're talking about is very simple. It is a loan, it is a loan between the plaintiff, the loan that the plaintiff got from Barclays.

That is the dispute. That has nothing to do with the law firm bankruptcy other than the fact that the reason he got the loan was he had to pay in his capital to the law firm, and he did it by getting a loan.

Now, one thing I would like to point out that I think is very important, originally when this case was filed, it was only filed by the plaintiff against Barclays, not the individual defendants. If you look at the original complaint and you compare it to this amended complaint we have here, the factual allegations are identical. There has been no change at

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So how can the plaintiff sue Barclays on a set of facts all. and now all of a sudden on exactly the same facts, no change, say that all these individuals are required to be in it.

I will tell you how. It was in order to get it to try to be transferred to the bankruptcy court which has nothing to do with anything. It does not arise out of the bankruptcy, and I would agree with your Honor, and I would say that you do not have that jurisdiction and we, by the way, have asked not only to dismiss, but asked for permission to file a motion for sanctions.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BLANCHETT: We just appeared in this matter yesterday and our time to answer hasn't come yet. We have not yet requested permission from the court to file a motion to dismiss, although we would like to do that.

Our position is essentially the same, which is the allegation against my client, Mr. Davis, is simply that he was chairman of the law firm, period, full stop. That is the only allegation in the complaint that is specific to my client, and it seems like it is a litigation tactic to gain advantage of the litigation in the U.K.

On the jurisdiction, I agree with you it is a potentially sticky issue. I am not prepared to take a position on it here, but our position is that the lawsuit against my client is frivolous.

THE COURT: Any other counsel?

MR. MICHAELSON: I agree with your Honor that there is a threshold issue here regarding jurisdiction, and it has shifted over time. In the initial complaint which was filed solely against Barclays, the jurisdiction sought was diversity. That lawsuit made sense in a sense that what is at issue here is truly a dispute between the plaintiff and Barclays over the loan that Barclays made to plaintiff for the purpose of finding this capital contribution to the firm.

That loan was made in 2010. The firm goes under.

Barclays is trying to receive that payment back, to be made
whole on the loan that it issued to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff is not only the former partner of the firm that owes
Barclays money, but there are a number of other partners

Barclays is proceeding against.

As a British bank that enters into these loan agreements that provide for U.K. law and U.K. courts, consent to jurisdiction in the U.K. courts, has filed a number of lawsuits that are related. There are five now pending in the U.K. courts, and the dispute with the plaintiff is one of those five. Those cases are proceeding.

What is happening here appears to be an attempt to forestall the judgment day that is coming in the U.K. proceedings. It started with a diversity action against Barclays. The amended complaint added the individual

defendants which destroyed diversity. He is now seeking jurisdiction under the bankruptcy statute.

The core dispute here between Barclays and Mr.

McMillan does not arise in bankruptcy, doesn't relate to

bankruptcy. It is a loan we provided, the bank provided to the

individual, and it was trying to get that loan paid back.

Anything that happens beyond that, that may relate to the other

individual defendants, I will let them explain their defense is

derivative of the core dispute here.

MS. LERNER: Your Honor, Caren Lerner.

I agree with your Honor that the question as to whether the court should abstain or stay or dismiss this action is premised under being some sort of underlying jurisdiction under 1334 (b). I don't think there is any contention that this is a core proceeding, and it doesn't invoke substantive rights under the federal bankruptcy law or a claim that would be capable of being in existence absent the bankruptcy estate.

At most I heard plaintiff's counsel state that this is related to jurisdiction having any conceivable effects. Any facts, if any, are so tenuous as not to support jurisdiction under 1334 (b), or even if there is any possible effect in the case, it will be because we happen to support two exercises, equitable extension or even mandatory extension.

There is something going on repeatedly in plaintiff's counsel lumping together all of the individual defendants in a

statement that all the individual defendants filed proofs of claim of duty and asking to be indemnified. Our client has not done so. Whatever arguments were made in the Northern District of California case, our client was not a party to those actions.

THE COURT: Is there anything else from plaintiff in response? I am not going to make an ultimate determination on this. It seems to me as a practical matter, since the parties wish to file motions, we should deal with the issue of jurisdiction and abstention before dealing with anything else.

Does plaintiff's counsel have anything else to add?

MR. FRITZ: No. I agree that is the proper way to

proceed, to deal with that issue first and take it from there.

THE COURT: Why don't we have, since I suppose this is the defendant's motion, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, a motion for mandatory abstention or discretionary abstention. Let's have the defendants file their moving papers first.

I assume all the defendants are going to be making a similar motion?

MR. BASSEN: Yes.

MR. FRITZ: I disagree. This would be my motion to have it removed to the bankruptcy court. The only request the defendants want to do, if it was going to stay here, to stay it pending the U.K. proceeding or dismiss it. They didn't make

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any request to remove it to bankruptcy court.

THE COURT: You are making a motion to refer it to the bankruptcy court?

> MR. FRITZ: Right.

THE COURT: Again it seems before I can, before I can do anything, I have to have jurisdiction. Obviously once we get past that issue -- if, in fact, I have jurisdiction and I am not required to abstain, and if I am permitted to abstain, but I choose not to abstain -- then we can deal with those other issues. Let's have the defendants file their motion. Could the defendants file their motion in a month?

MR. BASSEN: Sure.

THE CLERK: May 28th.

THE COURT: Let's give the plaintiff a month to respond.

> June 28th. THE CLERK:

THE COURT: And two weeks for a reply.

THE CLERK: July 12th.

MR. BASSEN: Excuse me. Would this put off the pretrial proceedings? You had sent it to the magistrate for discovery and all of that.

THE COURT: Yes, yes.

MR. BASSEN: We can have that put off?

THE COURT: We'll stay discovery while this is process

25 is pending. MR. BASSEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Is there anything else from plaintiff

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No. I believe that is it. MR. FRITZ:

THE COURT: Is there anything else from any of the defendants today?

MR. MICHAELSON: No, your Honor.

MR. BLANCHETT: Just as a housekeeping matter, we were going to file a letter or serve a letter to ask permission in court to file the motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: That is not necessary. Thank you. Thank you, all.

(Court adjourned)

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